Ideas from 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' by Willard Quine [1951], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' by Quine,Willard [Harvard 1976,0-674-94837-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Boulter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses